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INTRODUCTION 
The National Conference of State Legislatures has called campaign 
finance disclosure the most basic form of campaign finance regulation 
and further notes that “[a]ll states require some level of disclosure 
from candidates, committees, and political parties of the amount and 
source of contributions and expenditures.”1  One function of 
 
* Dick Carpenter is a Professor of Leadership, Research, and Foundations in the 
College of Education at the University of Colorado in Colorado Springs, CO.  He is 
also a director of strategic research at the Institute for Justice. 
** Jeffrey Milyo is  a Professor of  economics at the University of Missouri in 
Columbia, MO. 
 1. Campaign Finance Reform: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/campaign-finance-
an-overview.aspx#Disclosure. 
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campaign finance disclosure is to prevent corruption in candidate 
elections.2  The manner in which disclosure may deter corruption is 
not difficult to imagine.  For example, disclosure reports may be 
examined by investigative journalists and opposition researchers 
looking for evidence of unsavory relationships between contributors 
and candidates.  Further, disclosure of contributions to candidates 
may facilitate the enforcement of contribution limits in candidate 
elections.  After all, it would be difficult to know whether a 
contribution limit has been violated without some accounting of how 
much contributors have given to candidates. 
In this Article, we question neither the desirability of creating 
transparency in the ties between candidates and their contributors, 
nor the efficacy of disclosure regulations in affecting this end.  This is 
despite the fact that several recent studies cast doubt on the extent to 
which state campaign finance laws reduce either corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.3  Rather, we focus on compelled disclosure 
of political finances in non-candidate contexts, such as ballot measure 
elections and grassroots issue advocacy.  Grassroots issue advocacy is 
“any effort to organize, coordinate or implore others to contact public 
officials in order to affect public policy.”4  We argue that the 
extension of disclosure regulations to political activities unrelated to 
candidate elections cannot be justified in a similar way as a means to 
prevent corruption.  In non-candidate contests, there can be no 
revelation of an unsavory relationship between a contributor and a 
candidate because, simply, there is no candidate.  Similarly, because 
contribution limits do not exist outside of candidate elections, 
disclosure cannot facilitate the enforcement of non-existent 
contribution limits in non-candidate contexts. 
 
 2. JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE: 
STRANGLING FREE SPEECH & POLITICAL DEBATE 18 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and 
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 119, 174 (2004); David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws 
and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23, 38 (2006); Beth 
Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of 
Corruption, 8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 42 (2009); Adriana Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State 
Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Political Corruption? (Jan. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Campaign Finance 
Reforms Increase Trust and Confidence in State Government? (Apr. 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 4. JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., MOWING DOWN THE GRASSROOTS: HOW 
GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DISCLOSURE SUPPRESSES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 
Executive Summary (2010). 
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Another argument for disclosure regulations in non-candidate 
elections is that compelled disclosure of the finances of groups 
engaged in non-candidate political activities provides voters with vital 
information while at the same time imposing no real costs on those 
groups.5  In our experience, this argument is a fairly conventional 
view among advocates for increased disclosure, so for ease of 
exposition, we will dub it “the conventional view” of disclosure.  
However, we take issue with both elements of this view: first, that 
disclosure provides vital information to the general public and, 
second, that disclosure regulations impose little cost on political 
speakers and groups. 
We identify several challenges to the conventional view of 
disclosure requirements.  In short, there is little support from the 
social scientific literature for the notion that compelled disclosure 
generates important public benefits by augmenting voters’ 
knowledge.  However, there is evidence that disclosure regulations 
may impose significant costs on political activity.  This does not 
necessarily weigh against disclosure laws in candidate-centered 
elections, as there still remains the anti-corruption rationale for such 
regulations.  Nevertheless, our findings do call into question the 
rationale for extending compelled disclosure to other political 
contexts. 
The potential over-regulation of non-candidate political activities is 
of serious concern.  Ballot initiatives are an important tool for the 
public to circumvent and discipline non-responsive elected officials, 
as well as a means for increasing the public’s participation in politics, 
knowledge of pertinent issues, and trust in government.6  
Furthermore, “[g]rassroots lobbying is therefore not just the exercise 
of free speech and association, but the very process by which like-
minded people coordinate their efforts and petition government for 
the redress of grievances.”7  Together, these non-candidate political 
activities are the means by which many ordinary citizens become 
 
 5. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and 
Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 298 (2005). 
 6. See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: 
THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IN THE AMERICAN STATES 117 (2004). 
 7. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 2. 
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actively engaged in politics and the route by which new political 
entrepreneurs enter politics.8 
In the next Part, we describe existing state disclosure laws in two 
prominent non-candidate contexts: ballot measure elections and 
grassroots issue advocacy.  We then review the legal arguments for 
compelled disclosure in these contexts, followed by the social science 
literature as it pertains to the benefits and costs of compelled 
disclosure.  We conclude with a discussion of the lessons from the 
social science literature and implications for practical reforms to state 
disclosure regulations. 
I.  DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS IN THE STATES 
Campaign finance disclosure laws are ubiquitous in candidate 
elections in the states.9  Some states make it quite easy for interested 
persons to search disclosure reports online.10  The National Institute 
on Money in State Politics, a non-profit group located in Montana, 
collects data from state disclosure reports and also maintains a 
searchable database online.11  Given this archive, an Internet 
connection, and a few clicks of a mouse, it is a trivial exercise to 
discover that a Mr. Roy Bash, a lawyer residing in Mission Hills, 
Kansas, contributed $500 to the re-election campaign of the 
incumbent Governor of Missouri, Jeremiah Nixon, on June 30, 2011.12  
Using the online searchable disclosure database created by the 
Missouri Ethics Commission, it is also quite easy to verify this 
information and even obtain such personal information as Mr. Bash’s 
home street address and the identity of his employer.13  As we noted 
at the start, it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the 
 
 8. See JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., KEEP OUT: HOW STATE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAWS ERECT BARRIERS TO ENTRY FOR POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 7–8 
(2010). 
 9. See Primo & Milyo, supra note 3, at 29. 
 10. For example, the state of Illinois permits online searches of disclosure reports. 
See ILL. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.il.gov/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013). 
 11. See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 12. See Contributor Summary: BASH, ROY, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/contributor_details.phtml?d=1
381511515 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
 13. See All Contributions & Expenditures Search, MISS. ETHICS COMMISSION, 
http://www.mec.mo.gov/EthicsWeb/CampaignFinance/CF12_ContrExpend.aspx 
(search Year: “2012”; Last Name: “Bash”; First Name: “Roy”) (last visited Mar. 25, 
2013). 
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benefits and costs of such readily available information about 
contributors to candidates.  However, as we show below, several 
states also apply similar disclosure requirements to activities not 
directly connected to candidates. 
A. Ballot Measure Elections 
Every state and most localities permit some form of direct 
legislation through popular vote, from constitutional amendments to 
non-binding advisory measures.14  The most commonly employed of 
these ballot-measure procedures are initiatives, or proposals for new 
laws or constitutional amendments placed on the ballot via popular 
petition.15  Twenty-four states use initiatives, including many of the 
largest states by population: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Illinois, Missouri, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Washington.16 
In two recent reports, Jeff Milyo examines state disclosure 
requirements in ballot measure elections.17  In general, states apply 
very similar disclosure rules to candidate elections and ballot measure 
elections.  In Table 1, infra, we reproduce selected disclosure 
requirements and the minimum dollar thresholds that trigger these 
reporting requirements in all twenty-four of the initiative states.18  In 
other words, individuals and groups that advocate for or against a 
ballot measure must register as a political committee if they collect or 
spend in excess of a minimum dollar threshold.19  Registration also 
involves naming a treasurer who will be subject to punishment for 
violations of reporting requirements.20  As indicated in Table 1, in 
most such states, the thresholds of activity that trigger registration 
requirements are $500 or less.  The states with higher triggers for 
registration are: California ($1000), Illinois ($3000), Maine ($5000), 
Nebraska ($5000), and Nevada ($10,000).21  However, several states 
require registration for any amount of activity; these are: 
 
 14. See State I&R, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. U. S. CAL., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) 
(providing up-to-date information on ballot-measure procedures in the states). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See MILYO, supra note 8, at 20, 22, 25–26; MILYO, supra note 2, at 5–14. 
 18. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 19. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
 20. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 5. 
 21. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
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Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, 
and Wyoming.22 
In every state, contributor names and addresses must be reported 
for aggregate contributions over a minimum threshold that ranges 
from $0 to $1000, with more than half of the states setting this 
disclosure threshold at $50 or less.23  In addition, all but seven 
initiative states also require employer/occupation information from 
contributors.24  The states that do not require employer information 
are: Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming.25  Finally, among the initiative states, only 
South Dakota does not require itemization of expenditures; most 
states set the threshold for itemizing expenditures at $100 or less.26  
However, Alaska, Arizona, Montana, and Wyoming require all 
expenditures to be itemized, regardless of amount.27 
Political committees that fail to comply with these extensive 
disclosure requirements may be subject to fines and even criminal 
penalties.28  Further, because disclosure reports are filed multiple 
times throughout the year, the failure to correct a past oversight can 
lead to the accumulation of large fines.29  For example, in just this 
way, one ballot measure committee in California racked up over 
$800,000 in fines despite the fact that the maximum penalty per 
violation was only $2,000 and the committee had only raised and 
spent just over $100,000.30 
B. Grassroots Issue Advocacy 
Grassroots issue advocacy is the act of political organizing through 
communications to the general public.31  This activity may entail 
exhortations for members of the public to contact their elected 
officials in regard to some policy concern.32  Regardless of the 
presence of such exhortations, though, grassroots issue advocacy is 
 
 22. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 23. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 24. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 25. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 26. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 27. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8). 
 28. MILYO, supra note 2, at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. MILYO, supra note 4, at 2–4. 
 32. Id. at 3–4. 
CARPENTER & MILYO_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:21 PM 
2012] NON-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 609 
often described as “grassroots lobbying” or “outside lobbying.”33  We 
use these terms interchangeably throughout.  And while such 
grassroots communications are far removed from the activities of 
hired guns that roam state capitol buildings, several states 
nevertheless regulate grassroots lobbying as if it were a form of 
traditional and direct lobbying of legislators.34 
In a recent report, Milyo examines state regulation of grassroots 
lobbying.35  In Table 2, infra, we reproduce a list of states by the ways 
in which they define lobbying activities.36  Lobbying of public officials 
is regulated in every state, as well as at the federal level.37  In general, 
persons engaged in lobbying activities that exceed a threshold of 
activity must register and file periodic reports on their activities.38  As 
indicated in Table 2, however, only fifteen states, including Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Texas, define lobbying simply as “direct 
communication with public officials.”39  Twenty-two states define 
lobbying more broadly so as to include indirect communication with 
public officials.40  In these states (e.g., California, Georgia, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia), persons and groups that 
communicate with the public about policy issues and encourage 
people to contact government officials are considered to be engaged 
in lobbying.41  But in the remaining fourteen states (e.g., Florida, 
Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Washington), any communication 
with the public about policy issues meets the definition of lobbying.42 
As should be apparent, “grassroots lobbying” is a somewhat 
misleading term because communicating indirectly with public 
officials is quite unlike lobbying in the traditional sense.  A more 
accurate and descriptive term for indirect lobbying is “grassroots 
issue advocacy,” inasmuch as the action being regulated is 
communicating to the public at large, not the subsequent actions of 
individuals that may contact public officials.43 
 
 33. See KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION & INTEREST 
GROUP STRATEGIES 3–4 (1998). 
 34. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8–10. 
 35. See generally id. 
 36. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8). 
 37. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 7–8). 
 38. MILYO, supra note 4, at 9. 
 39. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8). 
 40. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4). 
 41. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 8. 
 42. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8). 
 43. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8–10. 
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In Table 3, infra, we reproduce a list of the threshold activity levels 
that trigger reporting requirements for grassroots issue advocacy in 
the thirty-six states that regulate this activity.44  As with ballot 
measure disclosure, persons and groups engaged in grassroots issue 
advocacy campaigns that meet some threshold of activity typically 
must register as lobbyists and file periodic reports.45  Such reports 
typically require disclosure of any specific legislative or regulatory 
interests, as well as itemized expenditures (and contributions if 
applicable).46  The dollar threshold for itemizing varies by state; for 
example, the state of Washington requires that “grassroots lobbyists” 
itemize contributions over $25.47  Also, as with ballot measure 
committees, failure to comply with grassroots lobbying disclosure 
requirements can result in civil and criminal penalties.48 
II.  WHY DISCLOSURE? 
The ground rules for government regulation of political campaigns 
were set more than thirty-five years ago in the landmark Supreme 
Court decision of Buckley v. Valeo.49  The Court ruled that 
regulations may not unduly burden First Amendment rights and must 
be narrowly tailored to prevent the “actuality and appearance of 
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.”50  
This standard begs the question of how to define corruption, but the 
Court has been fairly consistent in defining corruption as direct 
exchanges of cash for political favors and the like (i.e., bribery and 
influence-peddling).51 
Given that corruption requires an explicit quid pro quo, it follows 
that campaign contribution limits may be imposed on political 
committees that receive or make contributions in candidate elections, 
but not on candidates that choose to self-finance.  This is because a 
candidate cannot corrupt herself with her own funds.  Similarly, 
although a large contribution may influence the actions of a candidate 
in office, the plain language of a ballot proposition cannot be 
influenced in the same way.  It is no surprise then that states neither 
 
 44. See infra Table 3 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 10). 
 45. MILYO, supra note 4, at 11. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. Id. at 17–18. 
 49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 50. Id. at 26. 
 51. See Cordis & Milyo, supra note 3, at 6. 
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limit contributions to ballot measure committees nor impose limits on 
grass roots issue advocacy campaigns because these activities do not 
directly involve a candidate that could be party to a quid pro quo 
transaction. 
A. The Transparency Rationale for Disclosure Laws 
The conventional rationale for disclosure laws is that transparency 
itself is a desirable end.52  Indeed, this is seen clearly in legislative 
declarations of intent attached to lobbying and campaign finance 
statutes in several states.53  For example, consider the language of 
Rhode Island’s law: 
Public confidence in the integrity of the legislative process is 
strengthened by the identification of persons and groups who on 
behalf of private interests seek to influence the content, 
introduction, passage, or defeat of legislation and by the disclosure 
of funds expended in that effort.54 
Another example is found in this declaration from the state of 
Washington: 
The public’s right to know of the financing of political campaigns 
and lobbying and the financial affairs of elected officials and 
candidates far outweighs any right that these matters remain secret 
and private.55 
The strength of these claims is disconcerting in two respects.  First, 
the almost casual dismissal of a right to privacy ignores the Supreme 
Court’s repeated recognition that mandatory disclosure can impose 
unacceptably high costs on certain disfavored groups and speakers.56  
Second, not only are there are no empirical studies of the efficacy of 
disclosure in non-candidate contexts on corruption or public 
confidence in government, but more generally, there is little support 
for the notion that campaign finance regulations have such salutary 
effects.57 
 
 52. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5. But see MILYO, supra note 2, at 19. 
 53. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8. 
 54. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 22-10-1(b) (West 2012). 
 55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.010 (West 2012). 
 56. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 57. For a discussion of recent studies that cast doubt on the efficacy of state 
campaign finance reforms as a means of preventing corruption or improving public 
opinion of state government, see sources cited supra note 3. 
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Rather than assuming that disclosure in non-candidate contexts 
yields great social benefits at little cost, we review the social science 
research on disclosure for evidence that speaks to the benefits and 
costs of disclosure in non-candidate contexts.  The motivation for this 
exercise is our contention that in the spirit of Buckley, there is a need 
to demonstrate that such laws not only generate some benefit from 
disclosure laws in non-candidate contexts, but also that such laws 
impose no burden on the freedoms of speech and association or the 
right to petition. 
As discussed in greater detail below, the most prominent purported 
benefit of transparency through disclosure in the non-candidate 
context is a more informed electorate: transparency produces 
information that voters need or want in order to make an informed 
vote.58  Proponents of this view also assert that disclosure laws place 
no real burden on political speech or association, so there is no 
meaningful impediment to persons or groups exercising their First 
Amendment rights.59  These claims of informational benefits at no 
cost will be examined more closely in the next section.60 
But in general, is more transparency in politics always better than 
less?  Apparently not, as the existence of the secret ballot is one 
example where privacy concerns are widely perceived to trump any 
potential benefits from public disclosure of citizen’s votes in 
elections.61  The rationale for the secret ballot is that this mechanism 
makes it more difficult to bribe, intimidate, or otherwise coerce 
citizens to vote a certain way and protects citizens from reprisals by 
persons with contrary political views.62 
As a further demonstration that disclosure entails some costs, 
consider the nature of information that is and is not disclosed under 
current laws.  Details such as home address and employer provide 
some information about contributors, but might voters want to know 
more about contributors’ beliefs and associations?  Why not compel 
disclosure of union and interest group membership, religion, race, or 
even sexual preference?  Clearly, there is some boundary where 
 
 58. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 295. 
 59. See Richard Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age (Univ. Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law, Working Paper 
No. 2011-46, 2012). 
 60. See infra Part III. 
 61. See generally Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter 
Turnout Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1995). 
 62. Id. at 107–08. 
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privacy becomes more important than the public’s right to know 
details about who supports or opposes an issue. 
These examples suffice to demonstrate that transparency is not an 
unquestionable end in itself, but may also entail some costs.  
Consequently, transparency must be evaluated as a means toward 
some policy goal.  This requires some weighing of costs and benefits 
of disclosure laws in practice. 
III.  LESSONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE 
Among proponents for increased regulation of campaign finances, 
disclosure in the non-candidate context is widely supported as an 
effective and low-cost vehicle for achieving the purported benefit of a 
better-informed electorate.63  As disclosure advocates Elizabeth 
Garrett and Daniel Smith describe: “Disclosure is crucial to ensuring 
and improving voter competence in initiative and referendum 
elections.”64 
The argument for disclosure relies on a simplistic application of the 
theory of heuristics, or cognitive cues in political science.65  The basic 
notion is that voters spend little time and attention finding and 
processing information to make an informed vote.66  Therefore, 
according to disclosure enthusiasts, policymakers can improve voter 
competence by creating an information environment that provides 
citizens with “cues” or informational shortcuts that will help them 
vote competently.  Mandatory disclosure is alleged to be such a cue.67 
The logic is this: through mandatory disclosure, voters can see who 
supports and opposes ballot issues.68  Based on voters’ opinions of 
those supporters, voters receive a cue on how they might vote on 
issues.69  For example, suppose the National Rifle Association (NRA) 
gives money to a campaign supporting hypothetical ballot Proposition 
20.  A voter discovers this, and because she holds a negative opinion 
 
 63. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296; see also Hasen, supra note 59, at 4. 
 64. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296. 
 65. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting 
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994). 
 66. Id. at 63. 
 67. Michael Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter 
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 
1170 (2003). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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about the NRA, she votes against Proposition 20 under the premise 
that she likely would oppose anything that the NRA supports. 
Several scholars argue that ballot measure contests are particularly 
challenging for voters compared to candidate elections.70  Ballot 
measures can be complex and voters often have little information 
about how a specific policy will translate into policy outcomes.71  Also, 
in candidate elections, voters have the benefit of political party 
“brand names” attached to each candidate, which are particularly 
powerful and informative cues.72  For these reasons, disclosure of 
campaign contributors to ballot measure committees is thought to be 
particularly valuable information for most voters.73 
A case for disclosure of grassroots advocacy can be made along 
similar lines, although we are unaware of any scholars that make such 
an argument.  Instead, all of the relevant empirical studies examine 
ballot measure committees.74  It is probably safe to infer from this 
dearth of attention to disclosure regulations applied to grassroots 
issue advocacy that scholars have considered this a less important 
policy area than disclosure for ballot measure contests.75 
 
 70. See Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Do Voters Have a Cue? Television 
Advertisements as a Source of Information in Citizen-Initiated Referendum 
Campaigns, 41 EUR. J. POL. RES. 777, 777 (2002); Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 
297. 
 71. See sources cited supra note 70. 
 72. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 297; see generally Robert Huckfeldt et al., 
Accessibility and the Political Utility of Partisan and Ideological Orientations, 43 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 888 (1999). 
 73. See Kang, supra note 67, at 1166. 
 74. See, e.g., Lupia, supra note 65; cf. Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When 
Do Cues Eliminate Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated 
Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009) (a generalized empirical study, the results of which 
may apply to both ballot issue or candidate contexts). 
 75. We make this inference based on the theory of issue salience, which is 
explained in Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 66, 66 (2000).  Issue salience measures how important or prominent an issue 
is among various audiences.  A common way to measure issue salience is to count the 
number of articles or publications created on a given issue. See, e.g., Donald P. 
Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: 
Expanding the Scope of the Conflict, 58 J. POL. 332, 339 (1996) (measuring issue 
salience by counting the number of articles on gays and lesbians per 100,000 
population that appear for each state between 1985 and 1993 on the Newsbank 
Electronic Information System; the greater the number of articles, the more 
important, or salient, an issue is considered to be).  Applied here, we infer that 
grassroots issue advocacy is considered a topic of low importance or salience among 
scholars given the paucity of sources devoted to it. 
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Meanwhile, possible costs associated with disclosure are seldom, if 
ever, given serious attention.76  Again, seen through the lens of 
revealed preference, this lack of scholarly attention indicates what 
might appear to be a widely held consensus about the benign nature 
of disclosure.77  Yet, even proponents of disclosure have noted 
possible costs: “Concern about individuals’ First Amendment rights is 
heightened when statutes require disclosure of such information as 
the contributors’ occupations and employers.”78  Further, these same 
authors note that “[d]isclosure will certainly chill some speech, 
particularly from groups that fear voter backlash in the election.  
Moreover, regulation imposes costs of compliance that can be 
significant for smaller organizations.”79  Yet, in a thirty-four page 
article on disclosure specifically in the ballot issue context, those 
statements represent the total attention paid to possible costs 
associated with disclosure.80  Amidst a list of recommendations in the 
article, not one calls for research on potential costs.81 
There is not only a lack of empirical attention to the issue of 
disclosure costs.  The alleged benefits in the non-candidate context 
are frequently discussed but rarely examined empirically.  Indeed, 
even the aforementioned proponents acknowledge that 
“[n]otwithstanding . . . broad support, disclosure statutes have not 
received much scholarly attention.”82  Until recently, for example, no 
one bothered to ask if disclosure laws actually provide any 
informational benefit over and above information already available to 
voters.  Similarly, no attempt was made to measure to what extent 
information produced by disclosure was actually used.  Specific to 
costs, Garrett and Smith rightly identified possible costs associated 
with disclosure—chilled speech and participation—but up until the 
research published within the past five years, empirical examinations 
of such costs were almost non-existent. 
 
 76. For two recent exceptions, see Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance 
Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 276 (2010); Lloyd Mayer, Disclosures About 
Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 271–80 (2010). 
 77. See Richard Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
265, 266 (2000) (“In the endless debate between supporters and opponents of 
campaign finance limits, the one thing both sides seem to have agreed upon is the 
need for effective disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures.”). 
 78. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 326. 
 79. Id. at 304. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 295. 
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Recent research challenges the conventional wisdom about 
purported benefits of disclosure and reveals costs that are anything 
but benign.  Each of those studies is discussed in some detail below, 
beginning with research on alleged benefits and then moving to costs.  
Note that the focus is on disclosure in the non-candidate context.  
This Article does not review works on costs associated with disclosure 
in the candidate context.83 
A. Re-Examining the Value of Cues 
Decades of survey research have established that American voters 
possess low levels of information regarding politics.84  So low, in fact, 
that many prominent scholars have questioned whether democratic 
institutions can be trusted to accurately reflect the interests of 
citizens.85  However, in a seminal study, Arthur Lupia argued that 
voters employ cognitive shortcuts, or heuristic cues, as effective 
substitutes for encyclopedic information about candidates or issues.86 
Lupia analyzed voter knowledge and behavior in a California 
election that involved several competing ballot initiatives on 
reforming auto insurance in the state.87  Despite the complexity of the 
ballot measures, Lupia found that voters who were aware of the 
sponsors of the initiatives voted similarly to those that could correctly 
answer some factual questions about the initiatives.88  However, the 
frequent interpretation that cues allow voters to vote as if they were 
well-informed involves some heroic leaps of logic. 
 
 83. For a discussion of costs associated with disclosure in the candidate context, 
see BIPARTISAN COMM’N ON THE POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1974, OVERLY 
COMPLEX AND UNDULY BURDENSOME: THE CRITICAL NEED TO SIMPIFY THE 
POLITICAL REFORM ACT 23–33 (2000); Alexandre Gagnon & Filip Palda, The Price 
of Transparency: Do Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Discourage Political 
Participation by Citizens’ Groups?, 146 PUB. CHOICE 353 (2011); David Schultz, 
Disclosure Is Not Enough: Empirical Evidence from State Experiences, 4 ELECTION 
L.J. 349, 349–50 (2005); Randolph Sloof, Campaign Contributions and the 
Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws, 11 ECON. & POL. 83 (1999); Hanming Fang et 
al., An Experimental Study of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Transparency, 
Donations, and Policy Choices (June 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 84. See generally MICHAEL DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS 
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996). 
 85. See Philip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in 
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 219 (David Apter ed., 1964). 
 86. See Lupia, supra note 65, at 63. 
 87. Id. at 67. 
 88. Id. at 70–71. 
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First, in Lupia’s study, so-called well-informed voters were not 
necessarily informed about the policy consequences of the insurance 
reform measures on which they were voting.  For example, it is one 
thing to know that a reform proposal will roll back insurance 
premiums, but quite another to understand how such a proposal will 
affect the market for automobile insurance over the long run.  Thus, 
there is no guarantee that so-called informed voters are in fact voting 
“correctly.”  Second, the informed voters in Lupia’s study also had 
access to cognitive cues about which interest groups were sponsoring 
which measure.  Consequently, it is quite possible that these voters 
were also basing their voting decisions on cues—again, not necessarily 
voting “correctly”. 
Apart from the logical challenges to the hypothesis that heuristic 
cues substitute perfectly for information, subsequent studies have 
yielded decidedly mixed results.89  While it is clear that voters make 
use of cues such as party labels and major endorsements, it is by no 
means clear that voters make systematically better choices as a 
result.90  More importantly for our purposes, the empirical literature 
has focused on cues like political party and endorsements, not details 
of contributor information.91  A major difference between these 
different types of cues should not be missed: party labels and 
endorsements are disclosed to voters willingly.  State disclosure laws 
compel disclosure of information when some unpopular groups may 
prefer to remain anonymous.92  Advocates of disclosure almost always 
 
 89. For a recent review, see Cheryl Boudreau & Scott MacKenzie, Informing the 
Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion About 
Initiatives (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See also Shaun Bowler & 
Todd Donovan, Information and Opinion Change on Ballot Propositions, 16 POL. 
BEHAV. 411, 411 (1994) [hereinafter Bowler & Donovan, Ballot Propositions]; 
Bowler & Donovan, supra note 70, at 788; Mark Forehand et al., Endorsements as 
Voting Cues: Heuristic and Systematic Processing in Initiative Elections, 34 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2215, 2228 (2004); Mark R. Joslyn & Donald Haider-Markel, 
Guns in the Ballot Box: Information, Groups, and Opinion in Ballot Initiative 
Campaigns, 28 AM. POL. Q. 355, 356 (2000). 
 90. See Geoffrey Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group 
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 819 (2003); 
Wendy Rahn, The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing About 
Political Candidates, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 472, 492 (1993); Ellen D. Riggle et al., Bases 
of Political Judgments: The Role of Stereotypic and Nonstereotypic Information, 14 
POL. BEHAV. 67, 81 (1992). 
 91. Examples of studies on cues from party and endorsements include Forehand 
et al., supra note 89; Huckfeldt et al., supra note 72. 
 92. See Jessica Garrison, Gay Marriage Foes Want Campaign Contributions 
Anonymous, Citing ‘Harassment,’ L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2009, 5:42 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/01/proponents-of-1.html. 
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consider a scenario in which a nefarious group fools the public by 
hiding its identity.93  However, it is also possible that compelled 
disclosure ignites prejudice in listeners that might have been avoided 
had the speaker been able to remain anonymous.  For all these 
reasons, proponents of compelled disclosure err in assuming that 
disclosure necessarily provides valuable information to voters. 
It is by no means clear that voters can or will use disclosed details 
about financial activities of groups in a fashion that improves their 
decision-making.94  Further, given the easy availability of other more 
powerful cues, such as party labels and endorsements, it is by no 
means clear that there is any marginal value to be gained from the 
details of financial activities of groups.  Recent research reviewed 
below suggests there is not. 
B. Re-Considering the Benefits of Disclosure 
In 2010, David Primo completed a study that examined the 
marginal benefit of disclosure.95  We emphasize “marginal” because 
Primo was interested in examining the specific benefit of disclosure 
over and above information already available to voters without 
disclosure.96  This is an important distinction because, despite 
assertions that ballot issue elections are “low-information” 
environments,97 results from Primo and others (as discussed below) 
suggest that voters often have an abundance of information during 
ballot issue elections.  Therefore, Primo measured the informational 
value added specifically by disclosure.98 
To do so, he “designed an experiment where participants had the 
chance to vote on a ballot issue, but different groups were given 
access to different information about the issue.”99  This “allowed 
[him] to assess three aspects of voter behavior in ballot issue 
campaigns.”100  “First, are voters interested in information about 
 
 93. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296. 
 94. DICK M. CARPENTER, INST. FOR JUST., DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION 11–12 (2007). 
 95. DAVID PRIMO, INST. FOR JUST., FULL DISCLOSURE: HOW CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
DISCLOSURE LAWS FAIL TO INFORM VOTERS AND STIFLE PUBLIC DEBATE (2011). 
 96. Id. at 11. 
 97. Bowler & Donovan, supra note 70, at 779. 
 98. PRIMO, supra note 95, at 14. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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ballot issues?”101  “Second, and related, are voters interested in 
disclosure information?”102 “Third, does viewing disclosure 
information improve the ability of voters to identify the positions of 
interest groups on a ballot issue, once the other information they 
access is taken into account?”103  If so, one could surmise that 
disclosure can provide unique cues useful in deciding how to vote. 
A sample of 1,066 registered voters in Florida was presented with a 
hypothetical ballot issue in an online survey concerning taxes and 
illegal immigration, similar to Colorado’s ballot in 2006.104   
Then, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups, 
A, B, or C.  Group A was immediately provided with the 
opportunity to vote yes, no, or unsure on the ballot issue. . . .  
 Groups B and C were then presented with headlines that linked 
to a series of newspaper articles, as well as links to a voter guide and 
two advertisements.105   
Groups B and C differed in that Group C had access to two 
additional newspaper articles which contained information that was 
almost surely obtained by the reporter through campaign finance 
disclosure (e.g., the amount of a particular contribution).106 
Once individuals in groups B and C were done reviewing the 
information of their choice, they voted and were then given the 
following prompt: 
Below is a list of groups that have taken or could take a position on 
this ballot issue.  Based on your existing knowledge of the issue, as 
well as any information obtained during this survey, please assess 
the likely position of each group on this ballot issue.107 
Respondents were then asked to indicate whether the group 
supported or opposed the initiative.108   
The results were twofold.  First, “respondents with access to 
information about the ballot issue viewed very little of it.”109  
Approximately 40% of those in groups B and C chose not to view any 
information at all, and approximately 35% viewed only one to three 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
 105. Id. (footnotes omitted) 
 106. Id. at 15–16. 
 107. Id. at 16. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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items.110  Among those who did view information, the single most 
popular item was the voter guide—a document similar to guides 
created and distributed by state agencies during election seasons.111  
The least viewed items were the two articles available only to Group 
C that contained campaign finance disclosure information.112  One of 
the articles was headlined “Elite Donors Fuel Ballot Initiatives,” 
clearly indicating the story discussed well-known donors.113  Yet, 
despite the alleged importance of campaign finance information that 
would be created by disclosure, “[r]espondents preferred to read any 
other material . . . rather than an article featuring campaign finance 
information.”114  Moreover, those who read the “Elite Donors” article 
read three times more references than those who did not.115  
According to Primo, this suggests “voters who access campaign 
finance information are the least likely to need it to make informed 
choices.”116 
Second, in the comparison of the average number of interest 
groups correctly identified by each group, respondents in Groups A 
and B were virtually identical, while Group C—the group with access 
to sources with disclosure-related information—correctly identified 
more interest groups than those in A or B.117  At first consideration, 
this result appears to suggest that because respondents in Group C 
were the most successful in identifying interest groups, and because 
they were the only ones with access to disclosure-related information, 
the result must come from disclosure.118  Primo notes, however, that 
this is not the case.119  While only members of Group C had access to 
disclosure information, not all of them took advantage of this extra 
information.120  In fact, most did not.121  To isolate the effect of 
viewing disclosure information, Primo accounted for differences in 
viewing behavior by separating members of each group by the kind of 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 18. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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information they viewed.122  In so doing, he found that respondents 
who viewed the voter guide—no matter what other information they 
viewed—were most successful in identifying the positions of interest 
groups.123  Viewing disclosure information, on the other hand, had 
almost no impact.124 
Clearly, Primo’s findings contradict the primary purported benefit 
of disclosure—providing much-needed information to the 
electorate125—and further evidence in his report combined with other 
research appears to indicate the source of the discrepancy.126  Simply 
stated, disclosure-related information is superfluous.127  Voters enjoy 
an abundance of information about ballot issues.128  Moreover, 
numerous interest groups clamor for attention in order to tell citizens 
how to vote.129 
In a simple demonstration, Primo chose a 2010 ballot issue in 
Florida—Amendment 4—and performed a Google search on the 
proposed amendment.130  The result was a flood of information.131  He 
discovered position statements by the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association, the Realtors 
association, the Audubon Society of the Everglades, Clean Water 
Action, Friends of the Everglades, the Sierra Club of Florida, FL 
Public Interest Research Group (Florida PIRG), and the Save the 
Manatee Club.132  As Primo concludes, 
All of this information came from press releases or statements on 
the websites of groups involved in the initiative and was not related 
to government-forced disclosure.  Yet, from these simple searches 
that took minutes to perform, I learned that environmentalists and 
interests opposed to development were on one side of the issue, and 
development supporters were on the other.133 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Briffault, supra note 76, at 273. 
 126. For an example of other research, see Dick M. Carpenter, Mandatory 
Disclosure for Ballot-Initiative Campaigns, 13 INDEP. REV. 567 (2009). 
 127. See PRIMO, supra note 95, at 19. 
 128. Id. at 20. 
 129. Id. at 10. 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 12. 
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Similarly, Carpenter amassed information available to Colorado 
voters in 2006 on all of that year’s state ballot issues.134  Using 
LexisNexis, ProQuest, general internet searches, and searches of 
state-based think-tanks, he found that from January 1 through 
November 7, 2006 (Election Day), voters had access to more than one 
thousand pieces of information that dealt with ballot issues.135  This 
information ranged from newspaper stories, to the state voter guide, 
to policy papers and briefs created by think tanks.136  Not included 
were countless advertisements and position statements made by 
campaigns and interest groups at the time but that were largely 
unrecorded for posterity.  It seems little wonder, then, that disclosure-
related information would appear to have little marginal utility. 
Particularly interesting about all of these sources was how little of 
it made any mention of information likely produced by disclosure.137  
Less than 5% of newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the 
editor, think tank and nonprofit material, state-produced 
documentation, and campaign-generated documentation referenced 
disclosure information.138  That figured dropped to 3.4% in the two 
weeks leading up to the election.139 
This finding was consistent with another study that examined 
articles for state-level campaign finance from 194 newspapers 
covering all 50 states from 2002 to 2004.140  The author found that 
each newspaper averaged only about three stories per year regarding 
campaign finance.141  And less than 20% of those stories fell into the 
category of “analysis”—the category that would provide information 
about contributors to campaigns.142 
What makes these small percentages so telling is the assertion that 
“information entrepreneurs”—which include news media, think 
tanks, and other groups that disseminate information—report sought-
after disclosure information to voters who value such data but lack 
the time necessary to track it down (despite the fact that disclosure 
 
 134. See Carpenter, supra note 126, at 574. 
 135. Id. at 578. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Raymond La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign 
Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 237 
(2007). 
 141. Id. at 242. 
 142. Id. 
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data are easily available on state websites).143  Yet, these recent 
studies demonstrate something quite different: Information about 
who contributes to ballot issues and other statewide races is not, in 
fact, used extensively by information entrepreneurs in communicating 
with voters.  If disclosure-related information were indeed as vitally 
beneficial as campaign finance reformers claim, it seems that demand 
by information consumers would compel information entrepreneurs 
to provide it in more abundance, but amidst a superfluity of 
information available to voters, disclosure data does not appear all 
that useful.144  Taken together, these studies suggest that the marginal 
social value of current financial disclosure in non-candidate contexts 
is approximately nil.  Yet, research reviewed below suggests the 
potential costs are anything but. 
C. Re-Considering the Costs of Compelled Disclosure 
The costs of disclosure fall into three broad categories: 1) the risk 
of harassment to individuals based on disclosed information;145 2) the 
red-tape costs of compliance to political groups and political 
entrepreneurs;146 and 3) the deterrent effects of harassment and red-
tape costs on political organization and activity.147  Only recently have 
scholars begun to take seriously the task of investigating the 
magnitudes of these costs.  Even so, unlike the empirical studies that 
call into question the actual benefits resulting from compelled 
disclosure, recent research indicates that the costs may be more than 
trivial.148 
One measure of chilled speech and political association resulting 
from state disclosure laws comes from Carpenter’s 2009 survey of 
more than two thousand voters in six states in the weeks leading up to 
the 2006 elections.149  When asked about support for disclosure 
generally, more than 82% of respondents expressed approval for 
mandatory disclosure.150  However, once asked about whether their 
 
 143. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 297. 
 144. PRIMO, supra note 95, at 9. 
 145. David Lourie, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8 
Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2009). 
 146. See generally MILYO, supra note 2. 
 147. Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 126, at 579. 
 148. See Carpenter, supra note 126, at 570. 
 149. Id. at 570. 
 150. Id. at 574–75. 
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own political activities should trigger disclosure, the tables turned.151  
Fifty-six percent disagreed that their own information should be 
publicized—and that figure grew to 71% when disclosure included 
their employer.152  When asked why they did not want their 
information released, 63% cited a desire to remain anonymous.153 
Detailed responses tied to the desire for anonymity were 
particularly revealing.  Some stated, “Because I do not think it is 
anybody’s business what I donate and who I give it to,” and, “I would 
not want my name associated with any effort.  I would like to remain 
anonymous.”154  Respondents also frequently mentioned a concern for 
their personal safety or the potential for identity theft: “Because I am 
a female and [it’s] risky having that info out there;” “With identity 
theft I don’t want my name out there;” and “I wouldn’t donate money 
because with all the crazy people out there, I would be frightened if 
my name and address were put out there to the public.”155 
Other participants saw a relationship between disclosure and a 
violation of their private vote: “I don’t want other people to know 
how I’m voting,” or, “Because that removes privacy from voting.  We 
are insured [sic] privacy and the freedom to vote.”156  Still others 
noted the opportunity for repercussions.  “‘I think it’s an opening for 
harassment;’ ‘I don’t think my information should be out there for 
fear of retaliations;’ and ‘My privacy would be invaded by the 
opposition,’ illustrate such concerns.”157 
Respondents also often cited the issue of anonymity when asked 
about donating if their employer’s name were disclosed.158  One 
concern was over revealing where they work.159  For example, “It’s 
not anybody’s business who my employer is and it has nothing to do 
with my vote,” or, “My employer’s name is nobody’s business.”160  Of 
particular concern was the longevity of their job should their 
employer, through mandatory disclosure, learn of the employee’s 
beliefs expressed through a contribution: “Because that could 
 
 151. Id. at 575. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 575–76. 
 154. Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157. Carpenter, supra note 126, at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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jeopardize my job;” “I might get fired for that kind of stuff;” and, “If 
you were a union member and you vote on another side it would 
come back at you and hit you in the face.”161 
On the flip-side, others thought mandatory disclosure of the 
employer’s name might misrepresent an employer: “It is my choice, 
not my employer;” “I don’t think it is appropriate for my employer’s 
name to be given out related to what I do;” “Because I don’t know if 
he wants his name put out there;” “Because it’s a violation of the 
employer’s privacy;” “I don’t want to involve my boss 
involuntarily.”162  Still others feared for the negative affect on their 
own business: “I am self-employed, and I wouldn’t want that to be 
released to the public,” or, “Because I own a business and who I 
support is part of my own internal business practices and should not 
be public.”163 
This concern about the disclosure of personal information 
translated into a potential chill on speech.164  When participants were 
asked about their likelihood of contributing to a campaign in the face 
of disclosure, almost 60% said they would think twice about 
contributing when their personal information is disclosed.165  When 
asked if they would think twice before donating to a campaign if their 
employer’s name was disclosed, the number approached 50%.166 
In the abstract, then, citizens may appear to favor disclosure, but 
when the consequences of disclosure are personalized, their opinions 
change dramatically.167  Moreover, the “fear factor” associated with 
disclosure comes at a cost—less political speech.168  And recent 
events, including the well-publicized harassment of individuals and 
economic boycotts based on disclosed information, likely only 
increase the chill associated with compelled disclosure.169 
The costs associated with disclosure also come in the form of 
substantial burdens on political involvement and association that 
 
 161. Carpenter, supra note 126, at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. Carpenter, supra note 126, at 575. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 576. 
 169. See Elian Dashev, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First 
Amendment Protected Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 207, 247–51 (2011). 
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create significant disincentives.170  One way this is done—and one 
largely unknown to the average citizen—is through campaign 
committee requirements, specifically disclosure, imposed upon 
ordinary citizens who band together in an ad hoc fashion to convince 
others how to vote.171  In many states that allow ballot issues, any 
group that spends more than a certain threshold—sometimes as little 
as a few hundred dollars—to tell others how to vote must register 
with the state as an issue committee and track and disclose all 
fundraising and expenditures.172  These compliance requirements 
create an overwhelming and disincentivizing burden.173 
To measure just how burdensome the process can be, Milyo gave 
255 experimental subjects—mostly graduate students—a hypothetical 
campaign issue.  He then asked them to fill out the appropriate 
paperwork to register a ballot committee called Neighbors United 
and comply with reporting requirements of three different, 
representative states (California, Colorado, and Missouri).174  The 
participants were also asked to complete the forms for specific tasks 
common to grassroots issue advocacy, the latter of which included 
purchasing and making signs, t-shirts, and the like, or holding 
neighborhood information sessions at which refreshments were 
served.175  Of the 255 participants, not a single one correctly 
completed each of the twenty tasks on the campaign finance 
disclosure forms.176  The participant with the highest score correctly 
completed only 80% of the tasks.177  The mean correct score was just 
41%.178  Had this been a real world exercise, every single participant 
could have been liable for violating campaign finance laws.179 
In the experiment, the trouble started early: 93% of participants 
had no idea that they needed to register as a political committee to 
speak out in the first place.180  Without the explicit instructions 
provided, participants would have done even worse.181  While 
 
 170. MILYO, supra note 2, at 18. 
 171. Id. at 2. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. See infra Table 4 (citing MILYO, supra note 2, at 5–6). 
 176. MILYO, supra note 2, at 8. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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reporting simple contributions proved difficult, subjects had even 
more trouble with non-monetary contributions—the t-shirts, posters, 
flyers, and other supplies that are typical of grassroots activity.182  
Even when informed of the fair market value of the objects to be 
itemized—not always readily available in the real world—participants 
could only report a gift of $8 in refreshments correctly 30% of the 
time in California, 36% of the time in Colorado, and 24% of the time 
in Missouri.183  Another scenario in which a contributor spent $500 on 
t-shirts and then donated them to the group was the most 
formidable.184  No one in the California group reported this 
transaction correctly, and only 6% in the Colorado group and 14% in 
the Missouri group succeeded.185 
Subjects were also directed to aggregate multiple donations from 
an individual donor in two separate tasks.186  The highest score on 
either task from any state was only 7% in California.187  Participants 
simply made minor errors in arithmetic that threw off the sum total.188  
This illustrates how fines that are levied per violation can 
compound.189 
Participants were given the opportunity to comment in writing on 
their experiences with the disclosure forms and instructions.  Ninety-
four of the 255 participants did so.190  Of those, ninety out of ninety-
four expressed frustration with the forms: 
“These forms are confusing!”191 
“These forms seem lengthy, full of jargon, confusing . . . .”192 
“Too complex and not clear.”193 
“This is horrible!”194 
“My goodness!  These were incredibly difficult to understand.”195 
 
 182. Id. at 12–13. 
 183. Id. at 12. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 13. 
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 190. Id. at 17. 
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“One truly needs legal counsel to complete these forms . . . .”196 
“Seriously, a person needs a lawyer to do this correctly.”197 
“Worse than the IRS!”198 
“Good Lord!  I would never volunteer to do this for any 
committee.”199 
“These forms make me feel stupid!”200 
Another participant observed: 
I serve as the Treasurer of a political coordinating 
committee/political action committee formed within the last year.  
Even with that limited experience I found this exercise to be 
complicated and mentally challenging . . . .  The burdensome paper 
work and fines imposed for errors in reporting proved to be a hurdle 
that prevented the formation of our PAC (that is affiliated with the 
non-profit I work for) for a number of years.  That being said, in 
politics it is important to know the major contributors of our elected 
officials and hold contributors and recipients accountable to the 
degree possible.201 
That is, even a political treasurer sympathetic to mandatory 
disclosure (though notably for contributions to elected officials and 
not ballot initiatives) failed to comply with the law.202  This fact hints 
at something more than just ordinary citizens struggling with 
unfamiliar tasks and jargon; when even experienced political wonks 
have trouble filling out basic disclosure forms, it raises the concern 
that perhaps forms are not intended to be user-friendly. 
Milyo also queried subjects about their attitudes toward compelled 
disclosure in a debriefing session.203  While this exercise differs from 
Carpenter’s survey in that it is not representative, it is nevertheless 
interesting to consider the opinions of subjects that have just had a 
brush with disclosure regulations.  When asked if the paperwork 
burden of disclosure alone would deter ordinary citizens from 
engaging in independent political activity, 63% agreed.204  When 
prompted to consider that mistakes on disclosure forms could result 
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in fines or criminal penalties, 89% agreed that ordinary citizens would 
be deterred.205  Milyo concludes that “Subjects were sincerely 
frustrated in their attempts to complete the disclosure forms—and 
believed that these difficulties would deter political activity.”206  But it 
is not just individuals who can be swept up in these disclosure 
requirements.  So, too, can nonprofit organizations through the 
regulation of “electioneering communications.”207   
The term “electioneering communications” is most closely 
associated with the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) 
and covers political speech in ads on broadcast media that mentions a 
candidate for federal office within thirty days of a primary or sixty 
days of a general election.208  Shortly after BCRA’s passage, states 
began adopting similar laws, extending the reach beyond candidates 
to ballot issues and expanding the scope to things like flyers, the 
Internet, billboards, and even hand-lettered signs.209  More than a 
dozen states regulate electioneering communications for candidates, 
but two states—Illinois210 and Oklahoma211—also include ballot 
issues.212  Prior to Broward Coalition v. Browning,213 Florida also 
regulated speech concerning ballot issues.214 
The consequence of these laws in Oklahoma (and in Florida prior 
to Broward Coalition v. Browning) is that nonprofit organizations 
(among other types) spending more than $5000 to communicate with 
anyone about ballot issues must comply with the same types of 
extensive disclosure requirements discussed above.215  Practically 
speaking, this includes even non-political civic associations of any size 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 15. 
 207. MICHAEL C. MUNGER, INST. FOR JUST., LOCKING UP POLITICAL SPEECH: HOW 
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS LAWS STIFLE FREE SPEECH AND CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT 3 (2009). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.14 (2010). 
 211. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, Ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-16(c) (2012). 
 212. See MUNGER, supra note 207, at 1. 
 213. Broward Coal. of Condos., Homeowners Ass’ns., & Cmty. Orgs., Inc. v. 
Browning, No. 4:08-cv-445-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 1457972 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2009). 
 214. See MUNGER, supra note 207, at 4. 
 215. See id.  Illinois exempts 501(c)3 organizations from electioneering 
communications laws.  In Oklahoma, disclosure requirements are also triggered when 
an organization speaks to an audience of more than 25,000 people.  Given the 
unlimited reach of the internet, the audience of 25,000 is met instantly.  In Florida, no 
such thresholds existed.  Even a penny spent in electioneering communications 
triggered the disclosure requirements. See id. at 5–7. 
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that merely provide information, in newsletters for example, to 
constituents about forthcoming elections.216  Note that the 
information need not even be advocacy.217  Simply informing others of 
what a ballot issue says qualifies as electioneering communications.218 
To measure the costs imposed upon such organizations, Munger 
surveyed more than one thousand civic groups in Florida.219  These 
groups ranged in size from very small community charities to large, 
recognized nonprofits.220  His results identified significant concerns 
regarding the existence of expensive, burdensome, and intrusive 
regulations required of civic groups before they exercise their First 
Amendment right to speak about ballot issues.221  Namely, although 
less than 1% of the groups have an intrinsically political mission, at 
least 30% occasionally communicate with the public about policy 
issues, which made them a target of regulation.222  Many of the groups 
in the sample were small, with few donations to support their work 
and few employees.223  In more than half of the organizations, either 
no one kept track of contributions of any kind or one person did the 
task part-time.224  This means compliance would have imposed 
potentially large costs on these groups and diverted them from their 
core missions.225 
Particularly troublesome to many in the sample was how disclosure 
requirements would have forced most organizations to compromise 
donor privacy as a result of speaking about politics, thereby risking 
financial support.226  Almost 70% of the groups in the study strongly 
resist revealing donor information, and more than 36% of the groups 
would have expected a decline in fundraising if they were required to 
reveal detailed donor information.227  As Munger concluded, “[f]or 
nonprofits that do not want to compromise donor wishes for 
anonymity and yet want to keep their support, the best bet in a state 
 
 216. See id. at 1. 
 217. Id. at 3. 
 218. Id. at 10. 
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with electioneering communications laws is to stay silent about 
politics.”228 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Freedom of speech and freedom of association are the twin pillars 
of American democracy.  These principles are so valued that the 
Supreme Court permits regulation of money in politics only for the 
purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.229  
Nevertheless, many states impose complex and onerous disclosure 
requirements on political groups participating in ballot measure 
elections or grassroots issue advocacy.230  These disclosure regulations 
tend to be very similar to those required of political committees 
active in candidate elections, even though there is no anti-corruption 
rationale for disclosure in non-candidate contexts.231 
Policy makers and reform advocates typically assume that the 
benefits of disclosure are significant and that the costs are trivial.232  
However, recent research consistently finds just the opposite.233  State 
disclosure laws require frequent and detailed reports and impose 
penalties for non-compliance.234  Large, well-organized and well-
financed interest groups are probably not much deterred by such red-
tape costs, but experimental evidence reveals that ordinary citizens 
find disclosure requirements to be baffling and intimidating.235  
Having been exposed to actual disclosure forms and instructions, 
participants in the compliance experiment expressed incredulity at 
existing disclosure regulations, and when asked if the process of 
complying with such regulations would deter ordinary citizens from 
participating in independent political activity, more than 60% 
agreed.236 
Surveys also reveal that ordinary citizens are tolerant of disclosure 
requirements when they are imposed on others, but once they are 
asked about revealing detailed information about themselves, 
 
 228. Id. at 14. 
 229. Persily & Lammie, supra note 3, at 125. 
 230. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 2–3; MILYO, supra note 4, at 1. 
 231. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 18. 
 232. See Hasen, supra note 77, at 266. 
 233. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 21; MUNGER, supra note 207, at 18; Carpenter, 
supra note 126, at 579. 
 234. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 3. 
 235. See id. at 5. 
 236. Id. at 16. 
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respondents demur.237  Roughly 60% prefer to remain anonymous 
when supporting political causes and 71% object to providing 
employer information.238 
It isn’t just ordinary citizens that find disclosure costly.  Surveys of 
civic groups also reveal widespread concern and dissatisfaction with 
mandatory disclosure.239  The costs of disclosure, in red-tape and 
chilled political participation, are undeniably real.  But what of the 
supposed benefits? 
Proponents of mandatory disclosure in non-candidate contexts 
argue that transparency is an important end in itself.240  In effect, they 
argue that the public has a “right to know” who is speaking and that 
disclosure confers vital information to voters.241  However, claims 
regarding the efficacy of mandatory disclosure are simply not well 
supported in theory or in empirical analyses.242 
The claim that financial disclosure constitutes an informative cue is 
logically flawed.  There is no reason to believe that cognitive 
shortcuts necessarily yield better decisions.  Further, voters are 
inundated with more readily accessible and understandable cues from 
parties243 and endorsements,244 as well as actual information from 
media sources and campaigns themselves.245  In a world of low-cost 
and abundant information, the marginal benefit of details about 
contributors that give as little as $25 to a political cause are not likely 
to be very great.246  Recent empirical studies confirm that the 
marginal value of compelled disclosure is nil.247 
In summary, the small but growing literature that examines state 
disclosure laws finds negligible information benefits,248 but potentially 
large hassle costs associated with such regulations—costs that impose 
a non-trivial burden on First Amendment rights.249  While the studies 
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reviewed here examine the costs and benefits of disclosure mainly for 
ballot measure elections, the required disclosure tasks for grassroots 
issue advocacy are very similar, and so the lessons from this literature 
should apply to both contexts.250 
Given the dearth of empirical support for the prevailing view that 
disclosure is both vital to the integrity of democracy and costless to 
society, some rethinking of disclosure regulations in the states is in 
order.  As two campaign finance scholars noted, “[i]t is all too normal 
for legislators to pass laws, accept praise, and then not worry about 
implementation.  In a field such as campaign finance . . . this is 
particularly foolish . . .  A poorly implemented law in this field may as 
well be no law at all.”251 
Our review of state disclosure laws reveals that states mandate 
registration and reporting of political activities at fairly low levels of 
activity.  Since there is no anti-corruption rationale for disclosure in 
non-candidate contexts, an obvious reform is to eliminate mandatory 
disclosure for ballot measure elections and grass roots advocacy.  
Indeed, citizens in fourteen states appear to navigate state politics just 
fine despite the absence of state disclosure rules for grassroots 
lobbying.252 
Absent the repeal of disclosure laws in non-candidate contexts, the 
next best alternative may be to raise the activity thresholds for groups 
to register and report activities.  Further, there is no reason to impose 
the same disclosure rules of contributors to candidates on 
contributors to ballot measure campaigns or grassroots issue 
advocacy campaigns.  State policymakers should reconsider the need 
for collecting information on contributor identities (let alone 
contributors’ employers) in non-candidate elections.  Above all, in 
campaign finance regulation in non-candidate contexts, the 
presumption should be on the side of free speech and association.  
Those who advocate for greater regulation should bear the burden of 
proof in demonstrating empirically real benefits from such 
regulations, particularly in light of evidence of non-trivial costs. 
  
 
 250. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 22. 
 251. See Thomas Gais & Michael Malbin, Campaign Finance Reform, 34 SOCIETY 
56, 61 (1997). 
 252. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 8. 
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Table 1. Selected Disclosure Requirements for Ballot Measure 











and Address  
Include Employer 
or Occupation 
Alaska  500  0  250  0  
Arizona  500  25  25  0  
Arkansas  500  50  - 100  
California  1,000  100  100  100  
Colorado  200  20  100  20  
Florida  500  0  100  100  
Idaho  500  50  - 25  
Illinois  3,000  150  500  150  
Maine  5,000  50  50  100  
Massachusetts  0  50  200  50  
Michigan  500  0  100  50  
Mississippi  200  200  200  200  
Missouri  500  100  100  100  
Montana  0  35  35  0  
Nebraska  5,000  250  - 250  
Nevada  10,000  1,000  - 1,000  
North Dakota  0  100  - 100  
Ohio  0  0  100  25  
Oklahoma  500  50  50  50  
Oregon  0  100  100  100  
South Dakota  500  100  - - 
Utah  50  50  50  50  
Washington  0/5,000*  25  100  50  
Wyoming  0  25  - 0  
 
* The second figure represents threshold for reporting requirements.  Full reporting 
also triggered by single contributor givingmore than $500 in aggregate.  
  
 
 253. Milyo, supra note 8, at 23 tbl.7 (author compilation from state government 
websites on campaign finance disclosure). 
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Table 2. Definitions of Lobbying in the States254 
 
Direct communication with public 
officials 
Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa (lobbying the 
executive branch), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin 
Direct and indirect communication 
with public officials 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,  
Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, 
Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming 
Any attempt to influence public 
officials 
Alabama, Florida, Iowa (lobbying the legislature), 
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 




 254. Milyo, supra note 4, at 8 tbl.1.   
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Table 3. Thresholds for Reporting Grassroots Lobbying Activity in 
the States255 
Alabama – any employment or $100 in expenses 
Alaska – 10 hours employment in a 30 day period 
Arkansas – $400 in compensation or expenses in a 90 day period 
California – $5,000 compensation or expenses 
Colorado – any employment 
Connecticut – $2,000 in compensation or expenses 
Florida – any employment 
Georgia – $250 in compensation or expenses 
Hawaii – 5 hours employment per month or $750 in expenses in a 30 day period 
Iowa – any employment or $1,000 in expenses 
Idaho – paid $250 in a 90 day period 
Indiana – $500 in compensation 
Kansas – any employment or $100 in expenses 
Maryland – $2,000 in compensation or expenses 
Massachusetts – $250 in compensation or expenses 
Minnesota – $3,000 in compensation, or $250 in expenses 
Mississippi – $200 in compensation or expenses 
Missouri – any employment 
Montana – $2,500 in compensation 
Nebraska – any employment 
New Hampshire – any employment 
New Jersey – $100 compensation or expenses in a 90 day period 
New Mexico – any employment 
New York – $5,000 in compensation 
North Carolina – $3,000 compensation or expenses in a 90 day period 
North Dakota – no threshold 
Oregon – $200 in compensation or expenses in a 30 day period (or $500 in 90 days) 
Pennsylvania – $2,500 in compensation or 20 hours in any quarter 
Rhode Island – no threshold 
South Dakota – any employment 
Tennessee – any employment or 10 days  
Virginia – $500 in compensation or expenses 
Vermont – $500 in compensation or expenses 
Washington – $500 in compensation or expenses in any 30 day period (or $1,000 in 90 days) 
West Virginia – $200 in compensation or expenses in any 30 day period (or $500 in 90 days) 
Wyoming – any compensation or expenses 
 
 255. Milyo, supra note 4, at 10 tbl.2.  Annual thresholds unless otherwise indicated. 
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Table 4. Selected Tasks for Neighbors United256 
 
 Percentage of Participants Completing Task Correctly 
Task California Colorado Missouri 
Register as political committee 25% 72% 82% 
Statement declaring position on 
ballot issue 
36% n.a. n.a. 
Reporting initial funds on hand 44% 67% 52% 
Record $2,000 check contribution 60% 72% 80% 
Record Anonymous $15 cash 
contribution  
69% 51% 77% 
Record Illegal Anonymous $1,000 
Contribution  
2% 3% 8% 
Record Non-Monetary 
Contribution of $8 in refreshments 
30% 36% 24% 
Record Non-Monetary 
Contribution of $40 in supplies 
18% 46% 26% 
Record Non-Monetary 
Contribution of $500 in t-shirts 
0% 6% 14% 
Report expenditure of $1,500 for a 
newspaper advertisement 
49% 89% 72% 
(No miscellaneous clerical errors 
on all tasks) 
5% 6% 2% 
 
 
 256. Dick M. Carpenter, Jeffrey Milyo & John K. Ross, Politics for Professionals 
Only: Ballot Measures, Campaign Finance “Reform,” and the First Amendment, 
ENGAGE, Oct. 2009, at 80, 83 tbl.1.  
